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The paper looks at initiatives taken by the Mexican Employers’ Confederation (COPARMEX) 
aimed at promoting collaboration among civil society associations around the issue of public 
safety. Insecurity in the form of robbery, assault and kidnapping causes huge losses to business in 
Mexico. It is argued that business leaders are seeking to create consensus and form alliances 
among civil society around the topic of insecurity, both to combat crime but also as a strategy to 
strengthen links with civil society and improve the image of business, which has suffered due to the 




The paper explores how the voluntary involvement by non-state actors in public functions can 
become a source of moral authority and an effective form of governance. In this connection, it 
explores how business interests represented by COPARMEX2 are seeking to profile themselves as 
leaders in the struggle to assure public safety in a context where Mexican State is failing to do so, 
despite its constitutional mandate to protect its citizens.3 COPARMEX has adopted public safety as 
an integral part of its tasks and platform, a fact that it has been energetically disseminating in the 
media. The paper looks at COPARMEX initiatives: the Citizenship Council for Public Security and 
Citizenship Participation (CCSPJP) 4 and the Citizens’ Institute for Studies on Insecurity (ICESI), 
which are part of the organisation’s efforts to mobilise and reinforce societal consensus over crime 
and insecurity by providing both information and opportunities for citizen participation.  
 
Following Chalmers (et al. 1997), it is suggested that COPARMEX’s public safety initiatives 
exemplify a recent type of social mobilisation in Latin America that has taken the form of 
associative networks that seek to mobilise consensus over and encourage affiliation to a given 
issue among different social groups, bridging both institutional and class divisions. It is argued that 
these networks can be used to create a platform for certain groups to assume a social and moral 
leadership position from which to effect changes both in state priorities and in social values and 
political preferences. The paper draws on theories of risk, governance and social mobilisation to 
shed light upon how ‘languages of risk’ can be strategically deployed to frame an issue in such a 
way as to generate a consensus that can serve as a platform for extending broader social agendas 
in this way (Dean 1999: 147). COPARMEX’s efforts to claim a leadership role in the struggle 
against insecurity potentially offers a number of gains: pushing crime, an issue that has a 
particularly pernicious impact on business, higher up the public agenda, whilst at the same time 
providing opportunities to disseminate particular values and definitions of good, active 
                                            
1 The investigation is being carried out within the framework of a broader research project called ‘Consensus, Affiliation 
and Social Change’, involving researchers from Guadalajara University (Mexico) and Toulouse University (France). The 
paper is based on data from interviews with COPARMEX/CCSPJP staff in Mexico City and Morelos; as well as 
newspaper articles and information on the CCSPJP and ICESI from www.coparmex.org.mx.  
2 COPARMEX is not specific to any one sector or industry, so the organization may thus be said to be broadly 
representative of Mexican business interests (Puga 1993). Notwithstanding, it forms part of what Luna (1996: 111) calls 
the liberal conservative current in the business community. 
3 Under Article 21 of the Mexican Constitution the State at its different levels (federal, state and municipality) is 
responsible for public safety.  
4 In Spanish: Consejo Ciudadano para la Seguridad Pública y Justicia Penal. 
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entrepreneurial citizenship; establishing business in the role of moral leaders; and thereby also 
improving its public image. The latter is seen as especially necessary in view of the current 
proliferation of increasingly vociferous movements coalescing around a broadly anti-capital 
agenda, with potentially damaging implications for a business sector that is seeking greater 
influence in social and political affairs.  
 
The paper seeks to raise questions about initiatives where private organisations ‘voluntarily’ 
engage in public functions or aspects of them, as COPARMEX is doing in the matter of security. 
Whilst such initiatives may bestow a certain moral authority upon private organisations, the latter 
are not obliged to assume the accountability that typically accompanies these functions when they 
are performed by the public authorities. This phenomenon has important implications for 
governance in the current context of political change in Mexico. Whilst COPARMEX’s initiatives 
may from certain perspectives be understood as a sign of a healthy and growing pluralism resulting 
from political opening and the redistribution of public authority, they might also be interpreted as an 
attempt by powerful elites to mobilise the citizenry around their own political agendas. 
 
 
Crime and its uses 
 
“Public safety is the most urgent desire and demand of Mexican society. That is why the 
business people affiliated to COPARMEX have fought for a permanent, modern and 
comprehensive state policy on the matter” (CCSPJP) 
 
Crime and public insecurity are key concerns in Latin America today, although surprisingly little 
academic research has yet been carried out on these topics (Dammert and Malone 2003). With 
former threats posed by state terrorism, guerilla warfare and territorial conflicts now minimal, 
security problems in the region now revolve around the increasing violence, crime and drug traffic 
(Iglesias 2002; Tedesco 2000). Governments are increasingly impotent in the face of rising urban 
crime levels and are openly calling for social participation in combating this problem (Gaviria and 
Pagés 1999; Dammer and Malone 2003).5 Public confidence in the authorities’ ability to deal with 
crime and bring miscreants to justice is also low (Tedesco 2000).6 It is estimated that a mere two 
out of ten crimes7 are reported to the authorities, although it is notoriously difficult to measure the 
extent of the so-called ‘black figure’ (cifra negra) of crimes that go unreported.  
 
In Mexico alone in 2001, 4.2 million people were victims of crime, with costs and damages of 49 
billion pesos, or 0.85% of GDP (The Economist, 19 October 2002). There, as in other Latin 
American countries, citizens are increasingly taking measures to protect themselves, with barbed 
wire, ‘gated communities’8, privately-hired security and bodyguards, armoured cars and a whole 
array of security goods and services a common sight in wealthier urban neighbourhoods (Caldeira 
2000; Amerlinck 1999; Bislev et al.; Bislev 2003). Urban violence is seen as a broader symptom of 
the state’s incapacity to maintain law and order, run an effective judiciary and assure democratic 
governability (Tedesco 2000: 540), with the result that private individuals are increasingly taking 
the matter of their personal safety into their own hands.  
                                            
5 Government initiatives to encourage social participation in combating crime have been taken in several 
Latin American countries. An example is Honduras’ Cero Tolerancia public safety programme, based on the 
highly effective Zero Tolerance anti-crime campaign launched by Rudy Giuliani, mayor of New York, in the 
mid-90’s. The Honduran initiative included the hiring of 4000 new police officers, more stringent internal 
controls and strengthening of the police force and judiciary, and a community policing programme. 
(http://www.revistazo.com/may/titul3.html#top). 
6 With the exception of Chile (Dammert and Malone 2003: 86). 
7 According to ICESI figures. In the first half of 2002, 82% of all crimes went unreported  
(http://www.icesi.org.mx/index.cfm?Nid=184).  
8 Fenced-off residential communities, often manned by guards at the entrance (Bislev 2003). 
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In 1998 the former Mexican president, Ernesto Zedillo, publically acknowledged that law 
enforcement was inadequate, in part due to inefficiency and corruption in the police force and the 
judiciary, and launched an appeal to the nation for a National Crusade against Crime and 
Delinquency9 with the intention of encouraging society to join forces with the government in 
combating crime. Since then, citizen anti-crime initiatives such as México Unido Contra La 
Delincuencia (Mexico United Against Crime), Vecino Vigilante (Neighbourhood Watch) and the Ojo 
Ciudadano (Citizen Eye) programme have been organised nationwide, with participants ranging 
from individuals to groups such as neighbourhood organisations, trade unions, business and 
professional associations. For its part, the PAN government that took over from Zedillo in 2000 has 
energetically continued the effort to promote a change of security paradigm from the former model 
characterised by police response to crimes already committed, the political manipulation of justice, 
and corruption; to a new model based on crime prevention, citizen participation and the inculcation 
of a law-abiding culture (cultura de legalidad) (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2001-2006).  
 
This new approach has opened up spaces for non-state groups to organise and respond to social 
demands for greater public safety. In this context, and following a public call by President Vicente 
Fox10 for greater participation by the public in combating crime, the Mexican Employers’ 
Confederation (COPARMEX) launched its own anti-crime initiative, the CCSPJP, in 2001. The 
CCSPJP headquarters is based at COPARMEX’s offices in Mexico City, and it will eventually 
operate in all states. It functions as an autonomous organisation with representatives from a broad 
range of social organisations including representatives of parents’ associations (Asociación 
Nacional de Padres de Familia), higher education institutions, teachers, women’s groups, and 
other civic associations.11 Its aims are: to provide information and advice on crime and prevention; 
promote public participation in crime prevention; evaluate public performance in the matter of 
public safety, improve attention to crime victims, foment rapprochement between the police and the 
community, consult with civil society institutions on legal reform, and engage in dialogue with the 
authorities on matters of public safety. The CCSPJ was created alongside a new, independent 
multidisciplinary research institute, ICESI, whose task is to compile reliable crime statistics, 
disseminate them to the population, and to support the work of the CCSPJ. ICESI is a civil 
association formed by Business Coordinating Council (CCE), COPARMEX, the CCSPJP, the 
Monterrey Technological Institute (ITESM), the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) 
and the Este País Foundation. 
 
Through the CCSPJP and ICESI, COPARMEX has made intense efforts to disseminate the notion 
that a national consensus exists about the need to combat crime. The organisation has 
vociferously called for government action and accountability in the matter of public safety and 
impunity, pointedly drawing attention to its ineffectualness in this matter. It has done this in part 
through very public gestures, such as the recent recruitment and payment (to the tune of 4.2 
million dollars per year) of a consultancy company run by Rudy Giuliani, the former mayor of New 
York famous for his ‘zero tolerance’ anti-crime tactics, to help solve the crime problem in Mexico 
City, a signal that it considered the public authorities incapable of dealing with the task themselves 
(see The Economist 19.10.02; Televisa información 16.10.02). CCSPJP documents explicitly state 
their intention to reinforce State action and accountability in the area of public safety by 
encouraging civic participation in the matter of crime prevention. The organization frames itself as 
a mouthpiece for the pre-existing and rightful demands of civil society:  
 
                                            
9 Cruzada Nacional contra el Crimen y la Delincuencia 
10 During the inauguration by Fox of a Social Alliance Against Crime at the National Forum on Public Security in March 
2002. 
11 For instance, the recently-formed CCSPJP group in the state of Morelos includes 18 organisations from these different 
categories, with another 12 scheduled to join (Calvo Elmer 2002). 
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The mission of the CCSPJP is to achieve civic participation, in cooperation with the 
authorities, so that State policies in the matter of public safety and penal justice 
respond to the rights, demands and proposals of civil society (www.coparmex.org).  
 
For its part, the Citizens’ Institute for Studies on Insecurity (ICESI) supports CCSPJP activities by 
generating reliable, ‘expert’ information on the ‘true’ scale of crime and insecurity. ICESI 
documents state its principal aims as:  
 
to gain reliable, true and objective statistical information enabling analysis of crime 
tendencies in our country, to disseminate its results to the population and to support 
government agencies in planning and evaluacion of public safety programmes ... to 
offer certainty as to the reliability and technical rigour of the information generated, to 
provide indicators and indexes on social violence in order to secure the credibility and 
trust of society (www.icesi.org.mx) 
 
Another of ICESI’s stated aims is to gauge ‘perceived levels of insecurity in the different arenas 
that people live in’. Officials12 interviewed claimed that under-reporting of crime due to widespread 
lack of faith in the judicial system means that official crime statistics bear little relation either to 
‘real’ crime rates, or to people’s perceptions of insecurity, both of which are far higher than official 
statistics suggest. ‘Everybody knows somebody who has been a victim of crime’, as the CCSPJP’s 
director in Mexico City put it.13 The careful measurement and zealous dissemination of both these 
indicators suggests that COPARMEX is concerned that neither crime figures nor disquiet about 
crime (irrespective of whether this reflects actual levels of risk) should be under-estimated. 
 
 
The dispersion of public authority: association and consensus  
 
Whilst it is certainly true that crime is on the increase in Mexico,14 it could also be argued that 
compared with over half the entire population living below the poverty line (Cortés Cáceres et al. 
2002) the 4.2 million affected by crime during 2001 is a relatively small figure. Moreover, studies 
show that crime is statistically more likely to strike a smallish sector of better-off urban dwellers 
(Gaviria and Pagés 1999). As a recent newspaper report stated: ‘When we ask ourselves today 
what is the most serious problem in the country, the huge majority would say poverty, because that 
is the cause of all the other problems: violence, ignorance, insecurity, social malaise, lack of 
adequate public services, etc.’ (Calderón 2002a). Is COPARMEX, then, exaggerating the risk that 
crime and insecurity pose to Mexican society, and if so why? 
 
This question is dealt with in the paper by conceptualizing risk as a governmental strategy that 
constructs threats in particular ways that enable the deployment of particular measures and 
technologies, e.g. the citizen anti-crime networks and statistical compilation of anti-crime statistics 
under discussion here. Theories of governance have illuminated contemporary changes in the 
meaning and forms of government, citizenship and democratic politics. Governance may be 
defined as the process whereby it becomes ‘possible to govern human beings in ways that are 
compatible with the principles of liberalism and democracy’ (Rose 1999: vii). In the governance 
perspective, power in the modern, liberal state is not concentrated in one public authority, but is 
exercised through a plethora of institutions whose projects must be ‘harnessed’ to those of the 
State through processes of conviction and voluntary self-discipline rather than coercion (Lupton 
1999: 4). Legitimate government is achieved through ‘degovernmentalising’ the State and ‘de-
                                            
12 CCSPJP representatives at COPARMEX in Mexico City.  
13 Interview with Lic. Gabriel Funes, CCSPJP Director, COPARMEX Nacional, August 2002. 
14 As they are in Latin America as a whole. Some commentators (e.g. Tedesco 2000) consider that this is due to the new 
social relations generated by neoliberalism. 
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statising practices of government’ (Rose 1996: 41). Individual behaviour and decisions are, in turn, 
guided by information and expertise, which are no longer the exclusive prerogative of the political 
authorities but become a commodity in a market governed by competition, accountability and 
consumer demand. In such a context, individual citizens become ‘subjects of choices … to be 
governed through their freedom …’ (Rose 1996: 41). The redefinition of citizenship as contingent 
upon individual decisions is not morally neutral, however. The ‘good citizen’ cannot opt out, or 
behave passively, but must actively assume responsibility for his own life, health, wellbeing and 
safety and, by extension, for that of the community as a whole.  
 
Discourses of co-responsibility, participation and self-help play a key role in defining ethical 
parameters for the ‘right’ kind of choices. In line with this, risk is increasingly seen not as an 
ineluctable feature of the human condition, but rather as a human responsibility that can, in 
principle, be managed (Lupton 1999: 45). By extension, failures to ward off risks are seen as 
somebody’s fault, with the result that risk, accountability and blame become inextricably linked 
(Douglas 1992 in Lupton 1999: 48). According to some theorists, the self-conceptualisation of 
modern individuals as rational ‘choosing agents’ means that failures to manage risks become 
internalized as their own fault, since they have failed to take adequate measures to protect 
themselves despite being properly informed of the dangers (Lupton 1999: 4). This individualization 
of blame for risk is heightened under contemporary neoliberalism, where the moral and practical 
burden of minimizing social risk has shifted from the welfare state to ‘an advanced liberal society of 
prudential individuals and communities’ (Dean 1999: 132; O’Malley 1996 and Dean 1997 in Lupton 
1999: 5).  
 
Other writers have argued, however, that failures to ward off risks may in other contexts not always 
be individualized, but may be blamed on a given institution. Such failures can be used as ‘a stick 
for beating authority’ and holding it accountable (Douglas 1992 in Lupton 1999: 48). In this 
perspective, discourses on risk do not necessarily reflect ‘real’ dangers, but are formulated and 
employed with a particular political intent that singles out certain risks over others as threats that 
must be dealt with (Douglas 1992 in Lupton 1999: 6). Wherever a particular institution is deemed 
responsible for protection against a given risk, it can also be held accountable for failure to do so. 
Discourses on risk therefore become a technique for managing conduct through the assignation of 
moral obligation, and are therefore a form of governance. Debates on risk can likewise tell us 
something about where perceptions of responsibility for managing social risks are deposited within 
a given society. 
 
This perspective enables COPARMEX’s involvement in public safety to be explored from  
alternative angles than merely as a response to ‘real’ threats, although this is clearly also one 
dimension. Kidnappings, protection rackets and robberies of business premises and transport (e.g. 
lorries) have plagued the business community and deterred the growth of new business initiatives. 
Since state capacity to reduce criminality, poverty15 and illiteracy is dwindling, the business 
community has been obliged to try and protect its own interests (Puga 1993; Lara 2000). 
COPARMEX’s engagement in security matters may therefore be seen as a pragmatic attempt to 
curtail crime, which hurts profits, and to push public safety higher up the government agenda, in 
part by mobilizing the citizenry around this issue. 
 
It is arguably more interesting, however, to explore COPARMEX’s inititatives in the matter of public 
safety within a broader perspective of changing relations among the state, the private sector and 
civil society and current renegotiations of public authority. Some historical contextualisation is in 
                                            
15 According to recent estimates, over half the population is poor, with 24 per cent unable to meet even their basic 
nutritional needs. These figures, which result from official poverty measurements have been criticised for failing to take 
into account access to basic social rights such as health, education and housing. They should thus be taken as an 
absolute minimum estimate of real poverty levels (Boltvinik in Cardoso and Zuñiga 2002; Muñoz 2002). 
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order here. COPARMEX’s recent engagement with public safety issues is a particularly noteworthy 
phenomenon since corporate involvement in social affairs is a rather new (albeit increasingly 
prominent) phenomenon in Mexico.16 Historically, the heavy protectionism of the import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) period and the paternalist role assumed by the state in terms of social welfare 
meant that for most of the twentieth century, business was not obliged to engage in social affairs, 
partly because popular expectations of social protection were centred on the State rather than on 
business; and partly because of the prominent role of the Church in social provision and 
philanthropy (CEMEFI 2002).17 Over the past twenty years or so, however, political opening 
combined with States’ reduced sovereignty in a context of rapid economic integration, 
internationalisation and reforms that have severely curtailed public spending have led to a 
renegotiation of the conventional division of responsibilities between the State, the private sector 
and civil society and a redefinition of government, the political sphere and social protection 
paradigms.18 (Serbin 1997; Slater 1998; Yúdice 1998: 353).  
 
The context in which this renegotiation has taken place in Mexico has been rather different than in 
other regions, such as Europe, however. Whereas in the latter, social rights and the rule of law 
were once and still are a reality in many countries, this is far from the case in Mexico where, as in 
the rest of Latin America, the major structural reforms of the ‘80s and ‘90s19 and the ensuing 
austerity severely reduced the government’s capacity to guarantee these rights.20 The basic social 
rights that emanated from the 1910 Mexican Revolution and were enshrined in the 1917 
Constitution – to education, health and housing – remain unfulfilled, and have never guaranteed 
effective protection for the poor (Gordon 2001). 
 
Whilst the potential for unrest generated by the gap between de facto and de jure rights was kept 
more or less in check under the PRI regime, however, where opposition groups were typically 
quelled through a mixture of cooptation or repression (Veláquez 2003), popular demands have 
been harder to manage by legitimate means during the process of political opening that began at 
around the same time as the application of the neoliberal reforms described above. The toppling of 
the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) by the PAN, which campaigned under the slogan of El 
Cambio (Change), at the 2000 elections, generated high expectations among the population 
(Velázquez 2003)21 at precisely a time when the government was becoming progressively less 
                                            
16 Information on corporate philanthropy and social initiatives is, however, still scarce. See Lara (2000) for a list of 
philanthropic business initiatives and organisations. 
17 As in other countries like France where these two institutions have had a similarly influential position. 
18 Where a universalist approach to welfare has given way to a bipolar system consisting of a bismarckian linkage of 
social protection and employment on the one hand, and assistentialist programmes targeting the very poorest groups on 
the other (Sottoli 1999; Mesa-Lago. 
19 Most Latin American countries turned away from their ‘old’ development model of inward-oriented and protectionist 
import-substitution, which roughly spanned the period from the 1940s to the mid-80s, and began to switch to an outward-
oriented model of close integration with international markets – marking a ‘paradigm shift’ in the region’s economies from 
import-substitution to globalisation (Gwynne and Kay 1999: 3; Gilbert 1997: 325). These changes were part of larger 
packages of economic reforms supported by international agencies such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, and implemented through structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). The reforms have been inspired by 
the so-called ‘New Public Management’ paradigm that advocates the deployment of private sector management 
strategies in the public sector (Nickson 1998: 3). The reforms are neoliberal in orientation, increasing the influence of 
markets on economic decision-making and reducing that of national governments. They have promoted trade 
liberalisation, tariff reductions on imports, privatisation and decentralisation (Gwynne and Kay 1999: 14 and 68). The 
informal sector (defined by the Regional Employment Program for Latin America and the Caribbean (PREALC) as all 
self-employed workers (except professionals), non-remunerated family workers and domestic workers (Palacios 1990: 
120)) has grown rapidly as a result (MOST-FLACSO 1997: 5), leaving the poorest groups unprotected by social security 
provision there is, which is accessible through formal public or private sector employment only.  
20 Between 1980 and 1995, social spending on housing, social security and welfare, and education fell substantially, with 
spending on health unchanged (Grindle 2000: 27). 
21 Changes that have proved slow in arriving, causing increasing dissatisfaction among the population. Recent surveys 
indicate that 70% of Mexicans consider that President Fox ‘is not in control of the country’; and that the PAN’s campaign 
promises have not been honoured (Survey by the Public Opinion Department of the Presidency in El País, Monday 24 
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capable of responding to social demands. At the same time, channels for political representation 
are losing credibility, with political parties among the least trusted institutions in Mexico.22 This 
combination of circumstances poses a real danger for the inexperienced PAN government under 
President Vicente Fox, which has already faced a number of violent social protests that it has 
proved unable to quell effectively (Veláquez 2003).23 This unrest must be ‘managed’ in some way 
so that society does not become ungovernable (Yúdice 1998: 364). Here, discourses of 
participation and ‘co-responsibility’ are playing a key role in governance, since they shift the focus 
from the incapacities of government to the moral responsibilities of citizens to ‘help themselves’. 
These notions are key themes in Mexican government planning documents and social 
programmes.24 
The simultaneous shrinkage of the State coupled with increasing popular demands has also 
brought about changes in political representation in Mexico. Competition over scarce resources 
means that the prerogative to agenda-set has become fierce, with politics increasingly taking the 
form of lobbying (Canclini 1999). Successful lobbying depends on the capacity to form alliances 
and consensus around particular issues, and on access to information that can support one’s case 
- or indeed the means to generate and disseminate such information - which becomes a key 
political, economic and social resource. Chalmers et al. distinguish this new type of political 
representation from the four traditional ideal type structures of representation in the previous 
period:25 ‘clientelist, ‘populist’, ‘corporatist’ and ‘mass-mobilizational’. They argue that the new 
tendencies differ from all of these in that they are less tied to a single national structure of power, 
and that they place more emphasis on ties resulting from decisions to associate. Chalmers et al.  
propose a fifth type of representation to encapsulate this new development: the ‘associative 
network’: 
 Such a network links state and societal actors--sometimes including popular ones--
through interpersonal, media and/or interorganizational ties. Multiple networks process 
and reshape contending political claims through relatively open-ended and problem-
focused interactions. ‘They are distinctive not only in the way they link people with 
decision-making centers, but also by their multiplicity and relatively rapid 
reconfiguration over time. (Chalmers et al. 1997: 545) 
 
The authors relate the rise of associative networks to changes in global and domestic conditions 
and in the strategies employed by elites and popular actors (1997: 545). A key factor has been ‘the 
dispersion of decision-making activity away from the centralized state of the earlier era to a more 
polycentric state, with multiple centers of decision-making’, where associative networks contribute 
to shape and strengthen these emerging centres (1997: 545). Associational practices engaged in 
by active subjects have thus become a key condition for obtaining resources (Restrepo 2001), with 
‘informal’ consensus and linkages forged through persuasion, loyalty and trust assuming 
increasing importance (Linck 2002). Subjects become reconstituted as ‘members of 
heterogeneous communities of allegiance’ which assume increasing importance as a means of 
‘conceptualizing and administering moral relations amongst persons’ (Rose 1996: 41). How are 
                                                                                                                                                 
June 2002). 
22 According to the Latinobarómetro (2002) public opinion survey: Attitudes Towards Political Parties, only 12% of the 
population have confidence in the political parties. 
23 E.g. the machete-wielding smallholders (ejidatarios) mentioned above, who protested against the expropriation of San 
Mateo Atenco to make way for the construction of the new Mexico City airport; as well as groups of Barzonistas (check) 
and teachers who violently entered the Mexican Congress to put forward their demands (Velázquez 2003). 
24 E.g. the current National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2001-2006); and the Social Ministry’s 
(SEDESO) targeted social assistance programme, Oportunidades. 
25 Broadly, the ISI period that spanned from the 1930s-40s until the mid-‘80s in most Latin American 
countries. 
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such allegiances and consensus forged, however? And how do certain non-state actors accrue 
authority in this process? 
 
Moscovici and Doise define consensus as an essential aspect of community life ‘when people seek 
to associate together, act in concert and make decisions’ (1994: 1). Agreements reached in this 
way by a given social group become consensual when they are to be so evident that they become 
unquestionable (Linck 2002), The concept of consensus has been prominent in organization theory 
(Alvesson 1987), as well as in discussions of bioethical issues such as technical intervention in 
human reproduction (e.g. IVF/abortion). In the latter type of discussion, consensus is considered 
as ‘truth’ for all practical purposes, just as it was by ancient thinkers such as Aristotle, who 
considered consensus ‘evidence for the correctness of statements’ (Moscovici and Doise 1994: 3; 
Bayertz 1994: 42).26 Theories emphasise the difficulty of building general, normative consensus in 
modern societies which lack the dense ‘face-to-face’ relations and tight social and moral control 
that often characterise smaller communities (Bayertz 1994: 4). Rather than general consensus 
over broad issues, then, contemporary societies are said to be characterised by ‘particular 
consensus over a particular question by a limited number of individuals’ (Bayertz 1994: 5). 
Consensus in modern societies, therefore, must be both mobilised and sustained: it is a process 
rather than a result (Bayertz 1994: 3).  
 
Moscovici and Doise (1994:1) further differentiate between ‘consensus’ as an active concept, i.e. 
‘when people seek to associate together, act in concert and make decisions’; and the more passive 
notion of ‘consent’ or conformity, i.e. agreement concerning the ‘truth’ of a proposition – for 
instance that public safety is a good thing. Consent does not necessarily produce action, even 
when it concerns disagreeable or oppressive circumstances, as pointed out by theorists of 
collective mobilisation and resistance (Snow and Benford 1992; see also e.g. Gaventa 1980; 
Scott). Consensus, however, involves a more deliberate acknowledgement and presentation of a 
particular issue as good, bad or a problem with a view to acting upon it. Following Goffman, the 
presentation of an issue in a particular way may be referred to as ‘framing’: 
 
collective action frames serve as accenting devices that either underscore and 
embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust and 
immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable ... activists 
employ collective action frames to punctuate or single out some existing social 
condition or aspect of life and define it as unjust, intolerable, and deserving of collective 
action (Snow and Benford 1992 in Anker 2000: 45). 
 
Such framing devices may also be used to apportion blame for the situation framed as intolerable:  
 
[frames] focus attention on a particular situation considered problematic, make 
attributions regarding who or what is to blame, and articulate an alternative set of 
arrangements including what the movement actors need to do in order to affect the 
desired change’ (Hunt, Benford and Snow 1994 in Anker 2000: 54). 
 
The construction of such collective action frames may differ according to the scale of consensus 
the mobilisers seek to achieve, or according to the size of the group they seek to involve. In small 
societies, where ‘face-to-face’ relations predominate, physical gatherings or public debates may 
suffice to generate consensus around an issue, whereas in complex, modern societies, the media 
                                            
26 The key difference between ancient and modern conceptions of consensus, however, lies in their depictions of the 
relationship between the State and individuals. For Aristotle and his contemporaries, the state and its institutions precede 
man as an individual, with man conceived of as ‘naturally’ political; whereas for modern political thinkers such as Hobbes 
and Locke the State cannot exist legitimately without a general consensus: here, ‘individuals precede the state’ (Bayertz 
1994: 42-3). 
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can fulfil this function of ‘harmonising’ opinions before people are actively called upon to reach 
agreement (Moscovici and Doise 1994: 1). Thus, theories of collective action draw a parallel 
distinction between associational solidarity where people are drawn into movements on the basis 
of their networks of affiliation that, in turn, depend based on the identification of shared 
occupational, economic or political interests; and community ties where movements act on behalf 
of ‘natural’ communities such as families, village or ethnic group (Melucci 1996: 291 in Anker 54-5).  
 
It is suggested here that COPARMEX has deployed the problem of kidnapping as a ‘frame’ around 
which to mobilise consensus over public insecurity as a nationwide concern. The organization has 
had an ongoing dispute with the authorities over kidnapping statistics, which it claims are 
systematically underestimated (www.coparmex.org). COPARMEX keeps its own detailed database 
of kidnapping cases containing data about the worst-affected states, the number of kidnappings 
actually reported to the public authorities, types of kidnapping and fatalities resulting from it 
(www.coparmex.org). These statistics are regularly disseminated in COPARMEX press bulletins 
(see e.g. El Universal 20.10.02; El Heraldo de México 16.10.02; El Noticiero 15.10.02: further 
details in www.coparmex.org Boletines de prensa) and contested by the public authorities such as 
Chief of Police (Policía Judicial) and the Office of the Attorney General (PGJ) which issue counter-
statements refuting COPARMEX’s statistics (En Contraste, Televisa, 8.10.02; El Universal 
3.10.02).   
 
Whilst it is true that incidences of kidnapping have increased substantially since the early 1970s 
when it was virtually unheard of, to 732 cases in 2001, it is hardly a problem of epidemic 
proportions. Compared to other types of crime it is still relatively infrequent (13% of all crimes 
involve kidnapping according to ICESI’s survey),27 and its primary target group is business 
people.28 Kidnappers29 are, moreover, more likely to select their victims to maximise gains than in 
more arbitrary types of crime (Gaviria and Pagés 1999: 14).30 Yet COPARMEX describes 
kidnapping as nothing less than ‘one of the main problems facing Mexican society’, referring to 
Mexico as a ‘kidnapped society’ (sociedad secuestrada), and claiming that the problem of 
kidnapping should be ‘the State’s highest priority’ (www.coparmex.org). According to 
COPARMEX’s director, Jorge Espinosa: ‘Kidnapping is a crime that affects business people, but it 
has now transcended to affect the rest of society … this situation requires special attention from 
society and from all levels of government …’ (Interview De 1 a 3 690 FM, 16.10.02). COPARMEX 
has also declared publically that the political will to solve this problem is lacking (Milenio Diario, 
16.10.02.). 
 
The focus on kidnapping illustrates how a comparatively small-scale problem affecting mainly the 
business community is being deployed to mobilise wider societal concerns about crime, citizen 
safety and public accountability. It also shows how consensus-based politics does not preclude the 
subtle imposition of certain agendas by powerful groups purportedly acting in the name of ‘the 
people’. Far from being played out on an even playing field, consensus-based politics relies upon 
resources, such as information, that powerful groups are more likely to be able to mobilise. By 
engaging with the issue of public safety - around which it may be said that a broad tacit ‘consent’ 
already existed in Mexican society - and framed it as a particularly dramatic pressing problem 
requiring action, the issue is brought into far sharper focus than if it were left ‘unmobilised’ 
(Durkheim in Moscovici and Doise 1994: 4). Thus, in COPARMEX’s anti-crime initiatives we can 
identify an attempt to form associational solidarity with other societal groups, based upon a 
                                            
27 With almost half of these comprising so-called ‘express-kidnappings’ or ‘kidnappings light’ whose primary aim is 
robbery, usually involving hi-jacking a person for up to several days and forcing them to withdraw money from cash 
machines. 
28 Although kidnappings also occur among people from other social sectors. 
29 Burglars are another example of more selective crime (Gaviria and Pagés 1999: 14). 
30 Interview with CCSCJP official, Morelos. 
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consensus that the organisation has actively mobilised around the problem of public insecurity, 
with kidnapping as the key framing device. 
 
 
Governance and the struggle over moral authority in Mexico 
 
COPARMEX’s engagement with public safety issues can be better understood in the light of the 
above-mentioned changes in political representation and the dispersion of public authority, with 
private actors increasingly assuming public functions both in Mexico and in Latin America as a 
whole. The question remains as to why the organisation is going to such lengths to forge solidarity 
with civil society in the process. A look at relations between business elites and civil society can 
perhaps help to shed light on this. Business has an ambivalent image in Mexico today. Whilst on 
the one hand, the private sector is seen as more modern and dynamic and less corrupt than the 
public authorities, on the other, there is considerable scepticism among many sectors about 
business as a potentially positive social force. This is partly due to business having historically 
been seen as rather distant from the rest of society and from political life (Story 1990; Luna 1996). 
Post-revolutionary governments cultivated their support base in the popular classes, and business 
- or the bourgeoisie as it was then often despectively referred to in Mexico – was denied a positive 
role as a political subject though at the same time its economic interests were protected under the 
import substitution model (Puga 1993; Korzeniewicz 1994; Luna 1996).31 Underpinning this was 
the notion that capital, while necessary for development, could be kept under state control and 
harnessed to its interests (Bensabat Kleinberg 1999: 72). Businessmen were excluded from 
political activity, particularly as electoral candidates, with chambers of commerce and business 
associations never becoming incorporated into the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) as 
mass labour and peasant organisations were (Puga 1993: 50).  
 
This distance turned into open hostility under the presidency of Luís Echeverría in the 1970s, when 
businessmen were branded ‘reactionaries’, ‘bad Christians’, and even enemies of the people’s 
progress (Story 1990: 168).  The business sector was characterised by a ‘reactive’ stance towards 
the State rather than by active participation in political decision-making processes, although it 
maintained both presence and influence within the State through various informal channels, such 
as personal ties between businessmen and politicians (Bensabat Kleinberg 1999: 73; Kay 2003).32 
Effectively, however, the formal split between business and government meant a split between the 
seats of political and economic power that gradually became an ‘integral part of the Mexican 
political system’ (Puga 1993: 51). Added to this was the fact that business has, until fairly recently, 
been rather fragmented into ideologically dissimilar factions represented by various associations.33 
 
This began to change in the 1980s as globalisation, liberalisation and state reforms saw an 
increasing convergence between business and government interests. The business community, 
dissatisfied with their lack of political influence and with an economic climate hostile to their 
activities, played a key role in the political and economic transformations of the 1980s, helping to 
promote a ‘mixed economy’ model, and taking a more active part in politics through their 
participation in the PRI and PAN. During this period, relations between business and the 
government became more cordial, and based increasingly on negotiation rather than confrontation, 
with relations coming to be known as ‘a strategic alliance’ under the presidency of Salinas de 
Gortari from 1988-1994 (Luna 1992; Bensabat Kleinberg 1999: 71). Entry into NAFTA cemented 
                                            
31 The government of Echeverría in particular, and to a lesser extent López Portilla, deployed an anti-business rhetoric 
that sought to align the state with nationalism, and the business community with capitalist exploitation (Puga 1993). 
32 Puga (1993: 52-3) notes, certain historic agreements have enabled the business community to maintain an ‘efficient’ 
relationship with the State, e.g. the pact that underpinned the Banco de México, which officially defined the Mexican 
economy as ‘mixed’, and facilitated a number of alternative channels for business representation that did not require 
inclusion in the PRI or in government circles more generally. 
33 See Luna (1996) for an overview of these associations and their ideological affiliations. 
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this process (Bensagat Kleinberg 1999).  
 
The public image of business has, however, suffered from the increasing convergence of business 
interests with the unpopular neoliberal economic model pursued by Mexican governments since 
the 1980s. This has been a focus for recent massive popular opposition that is hostile to the 
national business community whose interests are seen to converge with those of transnational 
financial elites (Puga 1993; Canclini 1999: 22). This opposition has taken the form of alliances 
among a plethora of groups, including academics, student and environmental organizations who 
have coalesced around specific events or issues that have provided a focal point for expression of 
a broader, anticapital agenda. (Velázquez 2003). 34  Indignation at the poverty and social exclusion 
seen as resulting from the neoliberal economic model has found increasing expression in such 
popular protests, of which the Zapatista movement in Chiapas is the best known. The Zapatistas 
articulate specific material rights and claims for indigenous rights and democratisation, but have 
also made sophisticated use of the Internet and other media to campaign for a broader anti-
neoliberal, anti-free trade agenda (Yúdice 1998: 357; Chalmers et al. 1997). More recently, anti-
capital/neoliberal discourses have also provided the framework for protests over, inter alia, the 
construction of the new airport in San Mateo Atenco, which was blocked by smallholders 
(ejidatarios) protesting against the expropriation of their land for what was seen as miserly 
compensation.35 Again, a large number of other groups, including the Zapatistas and international 
organizations such as Greenpeace allied themselves to the ejidatarios’ cause (Velázquez 2003).36 
The Atenco protest polarized debates on the economic development model followed by the PAN 
government, which was depicted by some participating groups as portraying the interests of ‘the 
oligarchy and the bourgeoisie’ as opposed to that of the ‘exploited and forgotten people’.37 Similar 
discourses have framed recent protests against the Plan Puebla-Panamá and the Free Trade Area 
                                            
34 As in other parts of Latin America, social mobilization was formerly typically organised along class lines (e.g. labour 
unions, peasant or urban squatter movements) seeking chiefly material benefits from the State, which represented these 
groups’ main focus and interlocutor (Foweraker 1995: 29). Populism, corporatist structures and authoritarianism largely 
impeded broader alliances among groups with different interests, with civil society ‘weak and deliberately divided’ and 
frequently exhibiting authoritarian tendencies itself. Social movements were obliged to relate to the State in a strategic 
way in order to obtain scarce resources (Foweraker 1995: 26-28). Compared to European and US social movements, 
then, for whom state institutions were the target of groups wishing to implement change, in Latin America formal political 
structures of representation ‘often embodied social or class interests in ways unparallelled in the democratic systems of 
advanced capitalist nations’ (Davis 1989 in Foweraker 1995: 28).] The authoritarian legacy in Latin America has also 
meant that theoretical debates have been framed in terms of the divide between the state and civil society (Foweraker 
1995: 6). In the current context of State withdrawal in Latin America, however, recent social mobilisation has tended to 
coalesce around issues that cut across traditional class or sectoral boundaries and often have a transnational character, 
for instance environmental, ethnic or anti-free trade movements that are not necessarily aimed exclusively at obtaining 
resources for disadvantaged sectors, but are ostensibly motivated by questions of identity (Bell 2002; Serbin 1997). 
These so-called ‘new’ social movements have been said to represent a new kind of democratic citizenship based on the 
claiming of social and political rights both from the State and other authorities rather than on resource mobilisation 
(Alvarez et al. 1998: 12; Foweraker 1995). This approach is inspired by the idea that in post-industrial societies, 
movements are motivated by a ‘post-material’ logic which leads them to seek symbolic goods rather than material goods 
(Foweraker 1995: 31). It has been argued that given the extent of poverty and exclusion in the region and, hence, the 
continuing and crucial importance of material needs, the application of ‘new social movement’ theory to Latin America, is 
inappropriate34 (Foweraker 1995: 31). It has been suggested that identity- and strategy-based approaches are not 
mutually exclusive in the Latin American context, but, rather, that both the ‘cultural and the purposive’ dimensions of their 
activities should be taken into account (Scott 1991 in Foweraker 1995: 17). Thus, Cohen (1985 and 1992 in Foweraker 
1995: 21) has argued that social movements can construct both ‘personal and collective identity and instrumental and 
strategic activity’. This is arguably the case with respect to protests such as the San Mateo Atenco case. 
35 The initial government compensation offer to the ejidatarios was seven pesos per square metre. 
36 See e.g. La Jornada Sunday 29 September 2002 and La Jornada 23 November 2002 for reports on how the dissident 
teacher’s union, the CNTE, and the Mexican Electricity Workers’ Union (SME) joined forces with the smallholders of San 
Mateo Atenco in planning an ‘anti-neoliberal front’ to coordinate protests against the privatisation of the electricity 
industry, the construction of the new airport in San Mateo Atenco, and the reform of the education sector. 
37 Quote from Rebelión, the mouthpiece organization of the Partido Democrático Popular Revolucionario and the Ejército 
Popular Revolucionario (quoted in Veláquez 2003: 15). 
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of the Americas (FTAA), due to come into effect in 2005.38  
 
This dissatisfation and the mobilisations it has occasioned have articulated what has been seen as 
a growing disjuncture between the interests of the economic and political elites and the majority of 
the population (Canclini 1999: 22). The current PAN administration, with its historically prominent 
links to the business community (Hernández Rodríguez 1992 in Kay 2003: 295), its overly-
enthusiastic use of the media coupled with its mediocre performance in the three years since it 
came to office has added to cynicism. As a recent newspaper article pointed out, the majority of 
Mexican society ‘labours under the false idea that anyone who runs a business is doing nothing but 
exploiting their workers and cheating their customers, or at least trying to secure maximum profit in 
exchange for minimum effort’ (Calderón 2002b).  
 
COPARMEX makes no secret of the image problems suffered by business in Mexico, as the 
following citation from the organisation’s home page shows: 
 
In the face of public policies that restrict business activities and populist attitudes that 
declaim it; in the face of a type of propaganda and education that, while no longer so 
widespread, still perpetuate animosity and ignorance towards business, a question that 
we must address is: Who needs more, and better, businesses?39 
 
COPARMEX has been working energetically on several fronts to dispel this negative image 
(www.coparmex.org). Part of this endeavour has involved promoting an economic model based on 
a ‘market economy with social responsibility and citizen participation’ (www.coparmex.org), and a 
strong focus on improving employer-employee relations through a strategy called the ‘New Labour 
Culture’ (Nueva Cultura Laboral, henceforth NLC). The NLC is the result of collaboration between 
COPARMEX and the Mexican General Workers’ Union (CTM: Confederación de Trabajadores 
Mexicanos)  (www.coparmex.org),40 and is part of an effort to improve and strengthen relations 
between employers and workers in the context of globalisation and the ensuing changes in the 
process of production. The aim is to minimise social and labour unrest by promoting a culture of 
‘dialogue and consensus’ between workers and employers, instead of an atmosphere of 
‘confrontation and class conflict’ in the context of discussions over proposed reforms to the Labour 
Law (www.coparmex.org). Consensus-based decision-making is portrayed as a key instrument in 
promoting democracy, development, greater productivity and a harmonious employer-employee 
relationship:  
 
Dialogue between workers and employers in the framework of a New Labour Culture is 
the result of the profound conviction that agreement and consensus-building are the 
                                            
38 Anti-capital and anti-trade liberalisation discourses in the region are also providing a focus for political unrest in other 
Latin American countries: riots in Paraguay in 2002 over opposition to free-market policies; protests in Peru in June 2002 
against the privatisation of two power utilities; as well as in growing support for left-wing candidates who have refused to 
accept the US trade liberalisation agenda in the region (San Francisco Chronicle, August 7 2002), for instance, Brazil’s 
left-wing President Lula Ignacio da Silva, whose government headed the G-21 group of countries refusing to accept the 
agricultural reforma agenda at the Cancún trade talks (The Economist, 18-24 October 2003); and Evo Morales in Bolivia, 
who explicitly shuns the 'neo-colonialism' of the US in South America in favour of an anti-capitalist, local, indigenous and 
socialist agenda (The Observer, Sunday October 26, 2003). 
39 Spanish original: \Una pregunta que debemos formularnos respecto a la empresa, ante las política públicas que la 
obstaculizan, ante las posiciones populistas que la denostan, ante una propaganda y una educación, ya no tan vigentes 
pero cuyos efectos de animadversión e ignorancia todavía permanecen es: ¿quién necesita más y mejores empresas?’ 
(www.coparmex.org: ‘Bienvenida’). 
40 Concretely a document signed by the CTM and COPARMEX, called ’Principios de la nueva cultura laboral’, which lays 
out details of the duties and obligations of employers and unions, respectively (coparmex.org.mx: ‘Nueva Cultura 
Laboral’). This followed the drafting, in 1995, of a document entitled ‘Por una Nueva Cultura Laboral. CTM-
COPARMEX’). 
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ideal methods for overcoming any confrontation, contributing to consolidate a 
democratic culture and achieving the development of our country with social justice.41  
 
In the light of the above, COPARMEX’s attempts to highlight government deficiencies in the matter 
of public safety and at the same time to step into the gap themselves whilst aligning themselves 
with ‘civil society’ in umbrella organisations such as the CCSPJP may be seen as a counter-
mobilisation designed to improve relations with civil society and to project a certain distancing from 
the government. Government officials are, for instance, explicitly barred from any real influence in 
the organisational structure of the CCSPJP: they may attend meetings but they cannot vote or 
influence the agenda in any meaningful way. The CCSPJP is, in fact, openly sceptical about 
government-directed attempts to foment social participation: 
 
social participation directed by the government runs the risk of not being representative 
or appealing and may even be manipulated (www.consejociudadano.org.mx). 
 
Government is depicted in CCSPJP documents as indifferent, ineffective, corrupt and out-of-touch, 
compared to local, civil society organisations that are characterised as a source of efficiency and 
integrity. For instance, when asked about possible overlap between their work and the 
government-directed Ojo Ciudadano citizen anti-crime programme launched in January 2001,42 
CCSPJP officials interviewed reiterated the conviction that no project can work if imposed from 
above, only if it arises ‘from below’ (abajo-arriba). They articulated morality in terms of a vertical 
spatial dichotomy - top-down/bottom-up - and situated themselves as working alongside those 
‘below’ in the matter of public safety. At the same time, however, the CCSPJP identifies a need for 
‘social leadership’ (liderazgo social) of this civic participation - a leadership role it voluntarily 
assumes:  
 
So that the CCSPJP achieves its objectives it is essential that leaders of social, 
business, civic and academic organisations participate, in order to facilitate the 
launching, coordination, synergy, rootedness and public presence of the CCSPJP’s 
objectives ... (www.consejociudadano.org.mx) 
 
COPARMEX is explicit about its intention to extend its mission far beyond the matter of public 
safety to a more far-reaching influence on society. In this connection, the organisation has come in 
the firing line recently over its increasing involvement in politics, specifically its attempts to 
influence the next elections to the Chamber of Deputies by devising a civic programme called 
‘Making the Congress Work’. This includes plans to launch a political awareness programme to 
promote ‘A Reasonable Vote’, including the distribution of leaflets describing ‘the perfect deputy’ 
aimed at ‘raising awareness among business people and the citizenry about the type of men and 
women that Mexico needs in Congress 2003-2006’; public questionnaires applied by COPARMEX 
to candidates requesting their opinion on congressional reforms; the dissemination of information 
to citizens concerning the candidates so that they can ‘freely choose who they want to vote for’; 
and electoral observation (Camacho 2003).43 
                                            
41 El diálogo entre trabajadores y empresarios hacia una Nueva Cultura Laboral es resultado de la profunda convicción 
de que la concertación y la construcción de consensos, constituyen los métodos idóneos para superar culaquier 
confrontación, contribuir a afianzar la cultura democrática y alcanzar el desarrollo de nuestro país, con justicia social’ 
(wwwcoparmex.org ‘Principios de la Nueva Cultura Laboral’). 
42 Following an agreement between the Ministry for Public Security, President Vicente Fox, municipal politicans, 
business and civic institutions. Ojo Ciudadano was designed to encourage citizen participation in and evaluation of, 
crime prevention, with particular emphasis on the monitoring by citizens of public organisms involved in security matters 
(e.g. police and judiciary), and encouraging the reporting of crimes. 
43 COPARMEX’s overt involvement in electoral politics began in 1994, when the organisation acted as a civic 
electoral observer. Since then, it has carried out ‘rapid vote counts’ at the 1997 and 2000 elections; and in 
November 2002 COPARMEX’s president, Jorge Espinosa, gave ‘marks’ to deputies according to their 
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The organisation is also explicit about its aim to bring about changes in social values through the 
CCSPJP: 
 
It is necessary to identify educational and social organisations that are willing to 
collaborate through linking activities and curricula in a suitable way to the CCSPJP’s 
own strategies…We are proposing that civic education in schools should include 
education in values, so that if we educate our children properly in primary school, if we 
give them sex education when they are in fourth or fifth year, we have to teach them to 
respect others, to teach them values like the importance of reporting crime 
(www.consejociudadano.org).  
 
It is noteworthy here that COPARMEX’s principles have roots in Catholic doctrine (Sánchez 
Navarro ?), and that it forms part of what Luna (1996: 111) refers to as the liberal conservative 
current in the business community, a group that supports market preeminence, liberal democracy 
and champions private initiative, family and religious values with a view to bringing about 
fundamental changes in Mexican civil society and culture. The organisation has described itself as 
a ‘humanist organisation’ since its inception in 1929, since which time it has transformed itself from 
an organisation struggling for legal recognition and facing hostility from both government and 
society, into one that currently has 36,000 members employing a total of over two million workers 
From the 80s onwards, the organisation has become increasingly politicised, and has increasingly 
sought to establish itself as a leading figure engaged in ‘social and moral issues’, describing itself 
as ‘an acknowledged moral authority’ in Mexico today (www.coparmex.org ‘¿En qué creemos?’; 
Luna 1992: 198). Through the CCSPJP, COPARMEX appears to be seeking a leadership role by 
using the consensus it forges through its actions in the matter of public safety to disseminate a 
broader conservative agenda and values, influence electoral behaviour and reach out to an 
increasingly sceptical public. 
 
Public safety is an issue that lends itself particularly well to attempts to forge broad societal 
consensus. First, it cuts across traditional social divides such as class since it appeals both to 
middle- and upper-class concerns about crime and popular sectors’ demands for civil rights and 
frustration with police brutality and corruption (Yúdice 1998: 357). It is also an innately 
uncontroversial issue: few but the disturbed or professionally delinquent would argue against the 
need to combat it. The arbitrariness of crime also means that, much like terrorism, fear of it may far 
exceed any statistical probability of becoming involved in a violent incident, making crime more 
susceptible to dramatization than more predictable types of hazard. At the same time, it can be 
tackled in a far more visible way than, for instance, the poverty or unemployment of which it is 
arguably a symptom. Moreover, when crime strikes, its victims will usually evoke sympathy – 
regardless of their social origins. So, whereas crime may only constitute a real threat to a relatively 
small sector of the population, it has the potential to mobilise angst and a common front of 
indignation among a far wider group. Discourses of crime and risk therefore lend themselves 
readily to constructing cultural boundaries vis à vis ‘risky’ groups (Lupton 1999: 3), generating 







Concluding reflections: Social responsibility or moral authority? 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
performance. The worst marks were given to deputies whose ideological standpoint lay furthest from that of 
COPARMEX (Camacho 2003). 
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Whether publically or privately instigated, initiatives to improve public safety in Mexico are 
necessary, something that is not in dispute in the paper. The paper does, however, seek to 
highlight some dangers that can arise when powerful groups use their resources in such a way as 
to mobilise popular consensus around issues, such as public safety, that are primarily of concern 
to themselves rather than necessarily the immediate priorities of those groups they seek to enlist. 
In the case discussed above, it is evident that COPARMEX’s problematisation of crime per se risks 
drawing attention away from the poverty and social exclusion that actually lead to criminality. The 
symptom, crime – and notably kidnapping in this case - takes centre stage, monopolising 
resources and attention, while the causes remain unattended. In this way, crime becomes the 
‘scapegoat’ for all kinds of other insecurities (Dammert and Malone 2003: 80). The consensus 
forged in this way may then be used to propagate far broader agendas and values espoused by 
powerful groups, for instance electoral influence, as mentioned above.  
 
Thus, whilst COPARMEX’s mobilisation of civil society groups around security constitutes an 
example of the ‘multiplication of public arenas ... in which exclusion might be contested’ (Alvarez et 
al. 1998: 19), arenas that undoubtedly have the potential to foment democratic governance in 
Mexican society, overly optimistic conclusions in this regard should be treated with caution. As 
Chalmers et al. (1997: 545) emphasise, ‘associative networks … are not inherently more 
democratic than the earlier forms, although they have the potential to be so’ (1997: 546). The 
resources required to generate consensus around a given issue are inequitably distributed within 
Mexican society, with the risk that new spaces for claim-making opened up as a result of political 
opening and the shrinkage of the State are monopolised by other powerful groups, thus 
reproducing pre-existing social inequalities rather than attenuating them. 
 
The paper also suggests that COPARMEX’s initiatives in the matter of public safety form part of a 
counter-mobilising strategy to improve the image of business in a climate of popular hostility 
towards it. Its engagement in public security is a way of manifesting its ‘good will’ and responsible 
disposition vis a vis society. This is, however, problematic inasmuch as whilst engaging in public 
matters such as security, COPARMEX does not necessarily also assume the accountability that 
goes with them – indeed it takes pains to stress that accountability for failures to assure public 
safety remains very much a State prerogative. Precisely because its actions are voluntary, it 
benefits from a socially responsible image whilst avoiding ‘blame’ if its public safety initiatives 
prove unsuccessful. By deploying discourses of social participation and civic responsibility, 
responsibility for managing crime is, in fact, ultimately devolved to private institutions, e.g. the 
schools, civic associations and firms gathered together in the CCSPJPs – those perhaps least 
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